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Cornerstone of the American Law of Marriage 
Charles J. Reid, Jr* 
 
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium” 
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young 
University.  The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School, or Brigham Young University. 
* Charles J. Reid, Jr. is Associate Professor of Law at the University of St. Thomas School of Law 
(MN).  He holds a JD, a license in canon law from the Catholic University of America, and a PhD 
from Cornell University.  The author would like to thank the Rev. Robert J. Araujo, S.J., and Teresa 
Stanton Collett for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Of course, all errors in this article 
are the fault of the author. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article has several related concerns: it is, first of all, an 
historical investigation into one of the principal, if unacknowledged, 
sources of American juristic thought on marriage—the work of St. 
Augustine, the fifth-century North African bishop and doctor of the 
Church, who identified as the three essential elements of the marital 
relationship procreation, fidelity, and lifelong unity, or permanence. 
These three basic elements of St. Augustine’s thought on marriage 
were transmitted to the modern era through the work of the medieval 
Catholic canon lawyers and theologians and the Anglican canon lawyers 
of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Even though the Anglicans 
eschewed categorizing marriage as a sacrament—it was the sacramental 
quality of marriage that, to St. Augustine, required lifelong unity—
marriage remained a holy estate that demanded the lifetime loyalty of 
both parties, even in the face of marital failure. Only truly exceptional 
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circumstances permitted one to remarry during the lifetime of one’s 
partner. 
These ideas took root and flourished in nineteenth-century American 
thought on marriage, although they have been seriously challenged over 
the last several decades. After exploring the medieval synthesis of St. 
Augustine’s thought and its further development by the Anglican canon 
lawyers, the final two sections of this paper address what is probably the 
most comprehensive challenge to the Augustinian goods—the idea of 
same-sex marriage. 
As will be made clear below, the marital theory supporting the idea 
of same-sex marriage is the principle of affection. Affection is, of course, 
a good thing. One shudders to think of affectionless marriages. Such 
unions have rightly been the object of satire and scorn in popular 
literature and the media. They are hardly healthy or happy environments. 
But affection, personal commitment, and love between persons seem 
to be insufficient, without more, to provide a coherent foundation for 
marriage. What does it mean to say that a marriage is grounded on 
“affection”? What if affection, or commitment, vanishes? What if 
affection cannot be confined to a single party? What if loyalty shifts? 
The Augustinian goods provided a framework for answering these and 
other such questions. It is unclear what framework could or should 
prevail if the traditional conception of marriage comes to be supplanted. 
This Article is divided into four sections. Part II tells the story of the 
development of the Augustinian goods of marriage and their 
transmission to the modern era. Part III considers the crystallization of 
this set of ideas in the work of nineteenth-century American 
commentators and courts. By and large these scholars and judges never 
mentioned St. Augustine. But they nevertheless continued to operate in a 
mental universe shaped to a considerable extent by Augustinian ideals. 
Part IV then considers in some detail the implications of the same-sex 
marriage decisions of Baehr v. Lewin1 and Baker v. State2 for marital 
theory. Finally, Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 1. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 2. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
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II. THE AUGUSTINIAN GOODS OF MARRIAGE 
A. St. Augustine’s Formulation 
In his treatise De bono coniugali3 (“On the Good of Marriage”), St. 
Augustine sought to answer, in a sense, critics of both the left and the 
right. On the one hand were the Manicheans, the immediate target of his 
treatise, who maintained that marriage was not a social good at all. The 
fourth-century Manichees, to whose number St. Augustine had himself 
belonged in his youth, viewed the souls of human beings as consisting of 
sparks of light imprisoned within the created material order.4 The goal of 
the enlightened, on this theory, was to free the light and allow it to travel 
heavenward by refusing to cooperate with the created order. This refusal 
took the form of abstention from reproductive intercourse.5 “It is good to 
hate one’s body,” was the lesson of the Manichees.6 
If the Manicheans formed one wing of the debate, then the old pagan 
order of ancient Rome formed the other. Marriage, according to the 
ancient Roman legal sources, was chiefly an institution for protecting the 
assets and interests of the elites. It was the means by which men and 
women of proper social backgrounds might unite their interests, 
reproduce, and transmit their wealth to the next generation.7 Unlike 
Christians, pagan Romans did not view marriage as the exclusive outlet 
for sexuality. Concubinage, prostitution, and other types of sexual 
relationships were permitted under Roman law.8 Marriage, on this model, 
existed for the purposes of bringing into being households that served the 
economic, political, and dynastic interests of the elite. It did not exist for 
some larger, transcendent purpose. It was freely dissolvable through 
divorce if the proper formalities were observed.9 
 
 3. ST. AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, DE SANCTA VIRGINITATE 2 (P.G. Walsh, ed., 
2001). 
 4. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE 
CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS  107-112 (enl. ed., 1986). 
 5. Id. at 108-111. 
 6. Id. at 112. 
 7. The Roman term familia reflected this understanding of the marital relationship: “From late 
antiquity into the Middle Ages, the most common meaning of familia continued to be the property or the 
dependents (sometimes only the servants) of the household head.” See DAVID HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL 
HOUSEHOLDS 3 (1985). 
 8. James Brundage observes, after reviewing the evidence regarding the Roman practices of 
concubinage and prostitution: “Romans generally tolerated a wide variety of other sexual practices.” 
JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 27 (University of 
Chicago 1987). Among the practices Brundage identifies are masturbation and homosexual relations. Id. 
 9. See PERCY ELLWOOD CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 218-249 (University Press, 
Oxford 1969) (1930). 
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St. Augustine developed his theory of the goods of marriage with 
both of these schools of thought in mind. He sought specifically to 
synthesize Christian revelation with elements of Stoic philosophy and 
grounded his analysis on his vision of the nature of the human person. 
“Every human person,” St. Augustine commenced his treatise, “is a part 
of the human race and, by virtue of human nature, has a kind of 
sociability.”10 Indeed, St. Augustine emphasized that God created all 
persons from a single human being so that everyone might be bound 
together by a kind of “bond of relationship” (cognationis vinculo).11 
Friendship was thus a natural state of affairs based on the relationships 
that bound all persons, and marriage was its highest expression. 
St. Augustine moved at once from this foundation to explain that the 
first manifestation “of this natural human society” was the sexual joining 
of man and woman.12 Referring once again to the divine act of creation, 
St. Augustine observed that God did not create man and woman as 
strange and separate creatures alien from each other.13 Rather, He created 
the woman from the side of the man, thus signaling the power of their 
enduring union.14 Side by side, man and woman are thus joined, and so 
they proceed on the same path, planning and cooperating together.15 
Rejecting his Manichean past, St. Augustine affirmed that “the 
marriage of man and woman is something good.”16 Augustine dedicated 
the remainder of his inquiry to exploring why this should be so. It was 
not, he concluded, solely because of procreation. There was, he asserted, 
“a natural companionship between the sexes.”17 It would otherwise not 
be possible to speak of marriages among the elderly, where procreation 
was hardly possible.18 Among the elderly, Augustine acknowledged, it 
was a common and praiseworthy thing to find that they have renounced 
sexual relations yet retain an even purer, more powerful relationship for 
 
 10. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 2 (“Quoniam unusquisque homo humani generis pars 
est, et sociale quiddam est humana natura . . . habet . . . .”). 
 11. Id. On the significance of cognatio at Roman law, see ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ROMAN LAW 393 (1953); and W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO 
JUSTINIAN, 370-371 3d ed. rev. by Peter Stein (1963). 
 12. See AUGUSTINE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 2. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. § 3.3, at 6. (“[A]liquid boni esse coniugium masculi et feminae . . . .”). 
 17. Id. (“Quod mihi non videtur propter solam filiorum procreationem, sed propter ipsam etiam 
naturalem in diverso sexu societatem.” ) (“It does not seem to me [to be a good] solely because of the 
procreation of sons, but also because a natural companionship between the sexes”). 
 18. Id. 
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having done so.19 Thus it was not procreation alone that made marriage 
good. 
 St. Augustine therefore concluded that there must be a second 
good of marriage, which he identified as fidelity – the loyalty of one 
spouse toward the other. Augustine looked to St. Paul for guidance on 
this matter. In First Corinthians, Paul declared that “a woman does not 
have power over her body, but the man; similarly, the man does not have 
power over his body, but the woman.”20 This power over the body of the 
other St. Augustine took as evidence of the extreme loyalty married 
persons are required to show toward one another. Fidelity to the person 
of the other spouse was understood by Augustine as so valuable that it 
should count more than the bodily health which sustained life itself.21 
Betrayal of this loyalty was the practical disowning of one’s own body. 
Marriage, Augustine continued, had yet a third good. Augustine 
developed the argument in favor of this good obliquely, using as his 
starting point the good of procreation. May someone put aside a barren 
spouse in order to marry one who was not barren?22 This, St. Augustine 
admonished, is forbidden by the divine law.23 Even where the spouses 
are unable to procreate, even where one spouse has abandoned the other, 
Augustine asserted, they remain symbolically bound to one another.24 
This symbolic or sacramental bond is so enduring that divorce cannot 
break it. Even should a couple divorce, they would commit adultery if 
they attempted marriage with others.25 The Roman pagans married and 
divorced without guilt, Augustine observed, and Moses, because of the 
“hardness” of the hearts of the Israelites, permitted a man to repudiate his 
wife.26 But among Christians, “in our city of God,” a different rule 
applied.27 Marriage in the Christian dispensation was a lifelong unity of 
persons not to be broken by the merely personal judgments of the parties. 
B. The Synthesis of the High Middle Ages 
These three basic goods, these three basic values, as it were, 
provided the philosophical foundation for the marriage law of the middle 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. § 4.4, at 8. Cf. 1 Corinthians 7:4. 
 21. AUGUSTINE, supra note 3, § 4.4, at 8. 
 22. Id. § 7.7, at 16. 
 23. Id. The term St. Augustine uses for “divine law” is divina regula. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. § 8.7. 
 27. Id. § 7.7 (in civitate dei nostri). 
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ages. One might take as representative the work of the twelfth-century 
canonist Gratian. 
Although knowledge of Gratian’s accomplishments today is largely 
restricted to specialist audiences, his feat of legal organization, brought 
to fruition about the year 1140, was one of the most important 
contributions in the whole history of western law. Harold Berman has 
described Gratian’s work as “the first comprehensive and systematic 
legal treatise in the history of the West, and perhaps in the history of 
mankind—if by ‘comprehensive’ is meant the attempt to embrace 
virtually the entire law of a given polity, and if by ‘systematic’ is meant 
the express effort to present that law as a single body, in which all the 
parts are viewed as interacting to form a whole.”28 Although little is 
known about Gratian the man,29 his use of the scholastic method of 
dialectics—a question-and-answer format leading to synthesis of 
seeming opposites—remains a staple of legal reasoning even today.30 
Gratian premised his analysis of marriage, as did St. Augustine, on 
its procreative purpose. Those who couple together, not for procreative 
purposes, but merely for the satisfaction of lust are to be accounted not 
married persons but fornicators.31 Those who employ the “poisons of 
sterility” (sterilitatis venena) to frustrate the procreative purpose of 
marriage are also to be accounted as fornicators,32 while those who 
procure an abortion after the soul has infused into the unborn child’s 
body are guilty of homicide.33 Procreation was not an absolute 
requirement of married life: those unable to have or bear children might 
nevertheless validly marry.34 But the possibility of procreation was not to 
be frustrated by the parties themselves. 
Gratian, furthermore, interwove his theory of marital fidelity and 
indissolubility into his theory of marital consent. He began by 
considering whether it was consent to a common way of life that made a 
marriage, or rather the sexual relations between parties who have so 
 
 28. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION  143 (1983). 
 29. The most important treatment of the available biographical data concerning Gratian is John T. 
Noonan, Jr., Gratian Slept Here: The Changing Identity of the Father of the Systematic Study of Canon 
Law, 35 TRADITTIO 145 (1979). On the composition of Gratian’s DECRETUM one must now consult the 
pathbreaking work of Anders Winroth. See ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM 
(2000). For this work, Winroth has been made the recipient of a MacArthur Foundation grant. 
 30. See Berman, supra note 28, at 151-164; see also JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON 
LAW 44-69 (1995) (summarizing Gratian’s method and accomplishments). 
 31. See C. 32, q. 2, d.p.c. 1. 
 32. C. 32, q. 2, c. 7. The phrase sterilitatis venena occurs in the rubric. 
 33. C. 32, q. 2, c. 8. 
 34. C. 32, q. 2, d.p.c. 16. 
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consented.35 He concluded, based on the weight of patristic authorities 
that it was indeed consent that made a marriage, not copulation.36 
He did not, however, leave the analysis there. Sexual relations 
between married persons imparted to the union a special firmness. A 
consummated, ratified union among Christians, Gratian taught, might 
only be dissolved where it could be shown that one or both of the parties 
were gravely impeded from consenting to the marriage or from fulfilling 
the terms of that consent.37 Parties who separated from one another might 
be able to move to a new relationship only where a competent 
ecclesiastical tribunal recognized that the old marriage failed not because 
of any defect subsequent to the exchange of consent, but where the 
consent itself was ineffective.38 
This teaching became the common currency of the canonists and 
theologians of the middle ages.39 The work of Peter Lombard and 
Thomas Aquinas might be taken as representative. The principal reason 
for marriage, Peter asserted, was the procreation of children.40 It was to 
fulfill His command to “increase and multiply” that God first instituted 
marriage, Peter taught.41 
The three goods of marriage, Peter continued, embraced procreation, 
fidelity, and sacramental unity.42 The good of fidelity, Peter asserted, was 
sufficient to stand against all acts of infidelity.43 That one might not 
become sexually involved with another following marriage was the 
unbreakable rule.44 And the good of sacramental unity, Peter concluded, 
prevented one from remarrying even after canonical separation, except in 
those cases where an annulment had been obtained because of a failure 
of consent.45 
Thomas Aquinas, for his part, recognized that marriage was founded 
on the natural law: true, he conceded, it was not natural in the sense that 
all God’s creatures, human and non-human alike, married in order to 
have children. But, Thomas made clear, marriage was a natural 
 
 35. See C. 27, q. 2, cc. 1-15. 
 36. C. 27, q. 2, d.p.c. 15. 
 37. See Brundage, supra note 8, at 242-245. 
 38. Id. 
 39. On the relationship of law and theology in the middle ages, see Alain Boureau, Droit et 
théologie au XIII siècle, 47 ANNALES ESC 1113 (1992); and John van Engen, From Practical Theology to 
Divine Law: The Work and Mind of the Medieval Canonists, PROC. NINTH INT’L CONGRESS MEDIEVAL 
CANON LAW 873 (1997). 
 40. See PETER LOMBARD, SENTENTIARUM LIBRI QUATTUOR, 671, Bk. IV, dist. 30 (Paris, 1892). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. dist. 31, at 672. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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inclination of the human species and was intended for the procreation 
and education of children.46 This education was to consist of training in 
the virtues and should include lessons from both mother and father.47 
This much was the endowment—”the treasure”—that parents left their 
children.48 Similarly, Thomas argued, marriage also embraced the good 
of fidelity: through the marriage vow, man and woman placed 
themselves in the power of the other.49 The keeping of the marital vow, 
Thomas asserted, was not only a matter of theological virtue but a 
positive demand of justice.50 Finally, Thomas concluded, marriage was 
indissoluble.51 It was, after all, a sacrament and a sign of Jesus Christ’s 
own union with the Church.52 
C. The Anglican Canon Lawyers of the Early Modern Period 
The Protestant Reformation challenged some aspects of the 
Augustinian framework that the medieval canonists and theologians had 
constructed. John Witte has shown that in some respects the Lutheran 
and Calvinist reformers of the sixteenth century deepened the 
Augustinian goods by, for instance, connecting the faithfulness 
demanded in marriage with the protection marriage offered from sexual 
sins.53 In other respects, however, these Protestant reformers moved 
away from the Augustinian goods, particularly on the subject of the 
indissolubility of the marital union. Marriage, although a sanctified form 
of life and a holy estate, was not to be counted among the sacraments.54 
Hence, divorce with the possibility of remarriage was permitted, at least 
by the innocent spouse in cases of “[a]dultery, desertion, or 
cruelty . . . .”55 
On the other hand, as perhaps befit a Church that claimed to 
represent a via media between Catholicism and Protestantism, the 
 
 46. See ST. AUGUSTINE, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, SUPPLEMENTUM, Q. 41, art. 1, resp. (“Primo, 
quantum ad principalem ejus finem, qui est bonum prolis. Non enim intendit natura solum generationem 
prolis, sed etiam traductionem et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum hominis, in quantum homo est, 
qui est virtutis status”) (“First, as to [marriage’s] principal end, which is the good of children: nature 
intends not only the procreation of children, but also their upbringing and their training in the perfect state 
of man, which is the state of virtue”). 
 47. Id. See also id. at art. II, resp. 1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at resp. 3. 
 50. Id. at resp. 2. 
 51. Id. at resp. 4. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See John Witte, The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1046 
(2001). 
 54. Id. at 1052. 
 55. Id. 
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structure of Anglican canon law, as expounded by its principal teachers 
in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, reflected the three classical 
Augustinian goods even though the English canonists seldom credited St. 
Augustine as their source. Thus, Thomas Oughton, in an analysis of the 
marital impediments that drew deeply from medieval sources, noted that 
marriage was ordained both for the avoidance of fornication and for the 
procreation of children (d. 1740).56 
John Ayliffe (1676-1732) made specific mention of the “threefold 
matrimonial Good” in the course of his analysis of marriage.57 Marriage, 
as Ayliffe defined it, “is a lawful coupling and joining together of Man 
and Woman in one individual State or Society of Life, during the 
Lifetime of one of the Parties.”58 The “papists,” Ayliffe observed, 
retained the three-fold good of “Fides [fidelity], Proles [children], and 
Sacramentum [“sacramental unity”].”59 Although distancing himself 
from this formulation by attributing it to the “papists,” the only criticism 
Ayliffe offered involved the Roman Church’s practice of not allowing 
the clergy to marry.60 Ayliffe otherwise maintained silence on the 
continued vitality of the goods. 
But even if Anglican theology no longer retained marriage as one of 
the sacraments,61 and even though a writer like Ayliffe put some distance 
between himself and the Augustinian goods, the structure of Anglican 
marriage law was fundamentally shaped by the Augustinian goods. Thus, 
for instance, adultery remained a crime punishable by the English courts 
of common law or, where members of the clergy were concerned, by the 
ecclesiastical courts.62 
The retention of the Augustinian goods of marriage as the basic 
framework for analyzing marriage issues was especially evident in the 
treatment the law accorded divorce. 
The medieval canon law had recognized two types of divorce, a 
vinculo (which had the effect of dissolving the marital bond), and a 
 
 56. See THOMAS OUGHTON, ORDO JUDICIARIUS 286 (London, 1738), vol. I. 
 57. See JOHN AYLIFFE, PARERGON JURIS CANONICI ANGLICANI 360 (London, 1726). 
 58. Id. at 359. 
 59. Id. at 360. 
 60. Id. (“For to forbear Marriage is not a necessary Means to preserve Chastity, as we may learn 
from the lewd and scandalous Practices of the Romish Clergy, who commit such frequent Acts of 
Whoredom and Adultery . . . .” ). 
 61. See NORMAN DOE, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: A CRITICAL 
STUDY IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT  368 (1996) (“Theologically, holy matrimony is treated in the 
Church of England not as a sacrament but as sacramental in nature.” ); see also GARTH MOORE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH CANON LAW 82 (1967). 
 62. See JOHN GODOLPHIN, REPORTORIUM CANONICUM: OR AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE 
ECCLESIASTICAL LAWS OF THIS REALM CONSISTENT WITH THE TEMPROAL  469 (1687). Godolphin notes 
that “By the Laws of William the Conqueror the Adulterer was to be put to death.” Id. at 470. 
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mensa et thoro (which removed the obligation of common life, but did 
not free the parties to remarry). Divorce a vinculo was a practical 
consequence of the Augustinian good of sacramental unity. Only a flaw 
in the act of consent—say, because one of the parties had been forced 
into marriage or was actually a different person than alleged to be—
might result in the dissolution of the bond itself. But divorce a mensa et 
thoro on account of adultery, or because one of the parties had fallen into 
heresy, or was excessively cruel—the three classical grounds of 
separation—did not carry with it the right of remarriage.63 
The Anglican canon lawyers retained this basic distinction well into 
the eighteenth century. Thus, Richard Grey, writing in 1732, retained the 
original medieval language when he explained the divorce law then 
prevailing in England: 
Q: How many Kinds are there of Divorce? 
A: Two: Separation a Thoro & Mensa and Separation a Vinculo. 
Q: What is Separation a Thoro et Mensa? 
A: Separation from Bed and Board: And this is in cases of Adultery, 
Cruelty, etc., in which the Marriage, having been originally good, is not 
dissolved; . . . . 
Q: What is Separation a Vinculo? 
A: That which annuls or dissolves the very Bond of Matrimony . . . . 
Q: What are the Effects of that original Voidance and Nullity? 
A: The Wife is barred of Dower, and the Issue is illegitimate, and the 
Persons so divorced may marry any others; . . .64 
Richard Burn, in his comprehensive exposition of ecclesiastical law, 
engaged in much the same analysis, at points repeating Grey nearly word 
for word.65 Edmund Gibson, (1669-1748), librarian of Lambeth Palace 
and, eventually, Anglican Bishop of London, included in his compilation 
of canon law secular legislation of King James I prohibiting remarriage 
following divorce and declaring violations of the statute to be capital 
felonies.66 
 
 63. See CHARLES J. REID, JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY: RIGHTS AND 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW  294-302 (typescript, 2003). 
 64. See RICHARD GREY, A SYSTEM OF ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 146 (2d ed., 1732). 
 65. See RICHARD BURN, II ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 428-430 (2d ed., 1757). 
 66. See EDMUND GIBSON, I CODEX JURIS ECCLESIASTICI ANGLICANI 508. As the statute as 
excerpted by Gibson put it: “That if any person or persons within his Majesties Dominions of England 
and Wales, being married, or which hereafter shall marry, do at any time . . . marry any other person or 
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John Godolphin sought to reconcile legislation of this sort with the 
standard Protestant teaching – common on the European Continent – that 
innocent parties to marriages broken apart by adultery were free to 
wed.67 To be sure, St. Matthew’s Gospel seemed to allow this 
interpretation, Godolphin noted, but this must be balanced by reference 
to the texts of St. Luke and St. Mark and, most especially, St. Paul’s 
admonition in 1 Corinthians that “a wife is bound to her husband as long 
as he lives. But if her husband dies, she is free to be married to 
whomever she wishes, provided that it be in the Lord.”68 Even though 
Godolphin conceded that Protestant jurists of the Continent, like Hugo 
Grotius, took a different view and endorsed the right of remarriage, at 
least for innocent parties, “the ancient Canons of the Church, and the 
Constitutions of our English Reformation, have not thought fit to permit 
such liberty . . . .”69 
III. THE AUGUSTINIAN GOODS IN AMERICAN CASE LAW 
A. Chancellor Kent and the Natural Law of Marriage 
Chancellor James Kent (1763-1847), among the early leaders of the 
New York bench and bar, was extraordinarily influential in the shaping 
of American law.70 He was also a believing Christian who understood 
Christian principles as the bedrock upon which the law of the new 
American nation was founded. In a decision issued in 1811, Kent upheld 
a blasphemy conviction even in the absence of a New York statute, 
reasoning that the people of New York “profess the general doctrines of 
Christianity.”71 “Whatever strikes at the root of Christianity,” Kent 
asserted, “tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil government.”72 
 
persons, the former husband or wife being alive, that then every such offence shall be felony, and the 
person and persons so offending shall suffer death as in cases of felony . . . .” Id. 
 67. See GODOLPHIN, supra note 62, at 493-499. 
 68. Id. at 498. Cf. 1 Corinthians 7:39. 
 69. GREY, supra note 64. Grey noted that in exceptional cases Parliament might by special act 
grant divorce with the right to remarry: 
Q: May not the innocent Party, in case of Adultery, marry again? 
A: No: by the Doctrine of the Canon Law, and the antient Constitutions of the English 
Church, grounded upon two remarkable Texts of Scripture, Mark X. 11, and 1 Cor. vii 
11. But because our Saviour in another Place prohibiting Divorces and new Marriages 
thereon, specially excepts the Case of Fornication, it seems unreasonable that the 
Innocent should suffer for the Crime of another; and upon this Principle several Acts of 
Parliament, for the Divorce of particular Persons in the Case of Adultery, have expressly 
allowed a Liberty to the innocent Person of marrying again. 
 70. See CHARLES J. REID, JR., “JAMES KENT,” IN AMERICAN CONSEVATISM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
(Bruce P. Frohnen, ed., forthcoming, 2003). 
 71. See Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Rep. 343 (1811). 
 72. Id. 
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An ardent defender of the natural law, Kent was known to approach 
legal issues with a keen appreciation of the unwritten natural law 
inscribed on the hearts of all persons.73 In his Commentaries, written 
following his retirement from the bench, during his teaching days at 
Columbia University, Kent described the transcendent significance of the 
marital relationship: 
The primary and most important of the domestic relations, is that of 
husband and wife. It has its foundation in nature, and is the only lawful 
relation by which Providence has permitted the continuance of the 
human race. In every age, it has had a propitious influence on the moral 
improvement and happiness of mankind. It is one of the chief 
foundations of social order. We may justly place to the credit of 
marriage, a great share of the blessings which flow from refinement of 
manners, the education of children, the sense of justice, and the 
cultivation of the liberal arts.74 
In his capacity as Chancellor, Kent authored a significant opinion on 
the subject of the relationship of natural law and marriage. In Wightman 
v. Wightman, Kent was afforded the opportunity to apply the principles 
of the natural law to a question of marriage law because, as Kent 
observed, the New York law of his day, unlike probably any other 
jurisdiction “in the Christian world,”75 “[had] no statute regulating 
marriage, or prescribing the solemnities of it, or defining the forbidden 
degrees.”76 
The issue in Wightman was whether the petitioner, who persuasively 
alleged that she was temporarily insane at the time of her marriage, was 
capable of exchanging valid consent.77 Kent took notice of what he 
considered the peculiar situation of American jurisprudence: although 
there were no ecclesiastical courts in the new nation, American courts 
were nevertheless charged with enforcing the natural duties of the marital 
relationship. As Kent put it: “Are the principles of natural law, and of 
Christian duty, to be left unheeded, and inoperative, because we have no 
ecclesiastical Courts recognized by law, as specially charged with the 
cognizance of such matters?”78 
 
 73. An example of Kent’s natural-law based reasoning is found in Gardner v. Trustees of the 
Village of Newbergh 2 Johns. Rep. 162 (1816), in which Kent awarded compensation for the taking of 
commercial property even in the absence of an eminent domain statute allowing for the payment of such 
an award. 
 74. See James Kent, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 77-76 (3d ed., 1838). 
 75. See Wightman, 4 Johns. Rep. at 347 (1811). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 343-344. 
 78. Id. at 345. 
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Kent was not inclined to leave the natural law a dead letter, 
unenforceable by the courts. He proposed to define the natural law as it 
pertained to the case before him: “[B]y the law of nature I understand 
those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator has prescribed to 
man, as from the deductions of right reason, though they may be more 
precisely known, and more explicitly declared by divine revelation.”79 
Kent imputed to Chancery Court the power to decide matters of 
matrimonial law, even in the absence of clear statutory authorization.80 
Kent was comfortable in relying upon the natural law because he did not 
see it as some arbitrary and subjective body of moral norms, but as a 
body of principles exemplified to a considerable degree in the canon and 
the common law and therefore generally knowable.81 “If it were 
otherwise, there would be a most deplorable and distressing imperfection 
in the administration of justice.”82 
Kent relied upon these principles in order to rule that capacity to 
contract was a requirement of valid marriage.83 Kent took the opportunity 
to consider the broader application of the natural law to questions of 
matrimony. Stepping outside the scope of the question directly presented, 
Kent further considered and rejected the possibility that incestuous 
relationships might ever be recognized by New York: “Prohibitions of 
the natural law are of absolute, uniform, and universal obligation. They 
become rules of the common law, which is founded in the common 
 
 79. Id. at 348. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 347. This overt commitment to the principles of the canon law remained a feature of 
New York jurisprudence. In a case involving an allegation of female impotence, the Chancery Court of 
New York acknowledged the relationship of New York domestic relations law with English ecclesiastical 
law in order to require the provision of some evidence of impotence beyond the declarations of the 
parties. The Court explained the canonistic roots of this doctrine: 
The Revised Statutes have authorized a proceeding of this kind at the suit of the injured 
party, against the party whose incapacity it alleged. But it is expressly declared that no 
sentence of nullity shall be pronounced solely on the confessions or declarations of the 
parties; and the court is in all cases to require other satisfactory evidence of the existence 
of the facts on which the allegation of nullity is founded. This last provision was 
absolutely necessary to guard against fraud and collusion in such cases, and is stricly in 
accordance with the requirements of the ecclesiastical or canon law. 
Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige Ch. 554, 555 (1836). 
The Davenbagh Court subsequently added: “When the legislature conferred this branch of its jurisdiction 
upon the Court of Chancery, it was not intended to adopt a different principle from that which had 
theretofore existed in England, and indeed in all Christian countries . . . .” Id. at 556. 
The idea that canon law provided a framework for analyzing marriage cases remained alive even in the 
latter nineteenth century. The Nevada Supreme Court wrote in 1882: “The law of marriage and divorce, 
as administered by the ecclesiastical courts, is a part of the common law of this country, except as it has 
been altered by statutes.” Wuest v. Wuest, 17 Nev. 217, 30 P. 886, 887 (1882). 
 82. See Kent, supra note 74, at 347. 
 83. Id. at 344. 
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reason and acknowledged duty of mankind, sanctioned by immemorial 
usage, and, as such are clearly binding.”84 
Natural law was thus binding always and everywhere. Even in the 
absence of positive statutory enactment, marriage might thus be 
recognized and given force by the judiciary since its basic norms, its 
structure, and its fundamental goods and goals were inscribed on the 
hearts of all persons of good will and knowable through reason. The 
accumulated wisdom of the great writers on marriage, including the 
canonists of the middle ages and the Anglican canon lawyers of the 
English ecclesiastical courts might be consulted as a source of 
enlightenment and elucidation when doubtful questions arose. Kent, 
furthermore, was not alone in his endorsement of natural law as the 
foundation of American matrimonial law. It was the common 
understanding of the age.85 
B. The Procreative Purpose of Marriage 
When it came to giving specific content to the natural law of 
marriage, nineteenth-century American commentators and courts tended 
to look to the Augustinian goods of marriage, which had become, 
through the medium of the English ecclesiastical writers, the common 
deposit of legal teaching. Echoing the Augustinian analysis, as mediated 
through the Anglican canon law, Joel Bishop, one of the most important 
treatise writers of the nineteenth century,86 declared: 
As the first cause and reason of matrimony,” says Ayliffe, “ought to be 
the design of having an offspring, so the second ought to be the 
avoiding of fornication.” These two, observes Dr. Lushington, the law 
recognizes as its “principal ends;” namely, “a lawful indulgence of the 
passions to prevent licentiousness and the procreation of children, 
according to the evident design of Divine Providence.87 
 
 84. Id. at 250. Chancellor Kent was far from alone in ascribing a natural-law origin and content to 
marriage. Thus the Vermont Supreme Court wrote in 1829: “To marry is one of the natural rights of 
human nature, instituted in a state of innocence for the protection thereof; and was ordained by the great 
Lawgiver of the universe, and not to be prohibited by man.” See Overseers of the Poor for the Town of 
Newberry v. Overseers of the Poor for the Town of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 158 (1829). 
 85. Thus Bouvier wrote: “Marriage owes its institution to the law of nature, and its perfection to 
the municipal or civil law. . . . As an institution established by nature, it consists in the free and voluntary 
consent of both parties, in the reciprocal faith they pledge to each other.”  JOHN BOUVIER, 1 INSTITUTES 
OF AMERICAN LAW 101 (1851). 
 86. On Bishop’s importance, see Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST. 
REV 222 (1995). 
 87. See JOEL BISHOP, 1 NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION 326 
(quoting John Ayliffe, PARERGON, 360; and Deane v. Aveling, 1 Rob. Ec. 279, 298) (1891). 
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The procreative purpose of marriage was also a steady feature of 
nineteenth-century case law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in 1847, 
declared: 
The great end of matrimony is not the comfort and convenience of the 
immediate parties, though these are necessarily embarked in it; but the 
procreation of a progeny having a legal title to maintenance by the 
father; . . . [T]he paramount purpose of the marriage [is] the procreation 
and protection of legitimate children, the institution of families, and the 
creation of natural relations among mankind; from which proceed all 
the civilization, virtue, and happiness to be found in the world.88 
One finds this principle being asserted again in 1862, by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. That Court was confronted 
with a difficult problem of fraud: a husband learned following the 
marriage ceremony that his wife had become pregnant by another man 
shortly before the marriage.89 The Court ruled the marriage invalid 
because the wife, at the time consent was exchanged, was unable to 
fulfill the most important purpose of the marital relationship: 
[O]ne of the leading and most important objects of the institution of 
marriage under our laws is the procreation of children, who shall with 
certainty be known by their parents as the pure offspring of their union. 
A husband has a right to require that his wife shall not bear to his bed 
aliens to his blood and lineage. This is implied in the very nature of the 
contract of marriage.90 
The Missouri Supreme Court, confronting a complicated question of 
marriage and dower involving a white man who had married a Native 
American woman in his youth and subsequently married a white woman, 
reasoned: 
[W]hen there is a cohabitation, by consent, for an indefinite period of 
time, for the procreation and bringing up of children, that, in a state of 
nature, would be a marriage; and in the absence of all civil and 
religious institutions, may safely be presumed to be, as it is termed by 
some writers, “a marriage in the sight of God.”91 
C. Marital Fidelity 
Fidelity, St. Augustine’s second great good of marriage, was also 
recognized and given life by the American courts. The Vermont Supreme 
 
 88. Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847). 
 89. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. 605 (1862). 
 90. Id. at 610. 
 91. Johnson v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 30 Mo. 72, 85-86 (1860) (quoting Shelford on Marriage and 
Divorce). 
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Court, acknowledging the importance of fidelity, denounced as a 
violation of “the municipal law” and “the moral or divine law” the crime 
of adultery, whether committed by the married person himself or herself, 
or that party’s unmarried partner.92 Adultery, the Court observed, 
amounted to “filthiness and criminality” and should not be tolerated.93 A 
concurring opinion in a Georgia Supreme Court case explained that 
statutes against adultery and seduction had as their purpose the protection 
of “the sacred promise of marriage—the promise to become one—the 
promise of taking the vow of love and fidelity and protection for 
life . . . .”94 
Courts also called attention to statutory enactments that required 
fidelity as an element of marriage. The California Supreme Court noted 
that the obligations of marriage, assumed by all who undertake that 
contract, included “mutual respect, fidelity, and support.”95 Citing 
statutory authority, an Ohio Court declared: “Husband and wife contract 
towards each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support.”96 
The Louisiana Supreme Court repeated the argument of counsel in 
asserting that “The conclusion to be derived from consideration of the 
different articles of the code appears to be an unavoidable one. Mutual 
fidelity, support and assistance are enjoined . . . upon the husband and 
wife. Their relations, each to the other, presuppose as much.”97 
A pre-Civil War Ohio case stressed the relationship between fidelity 
and free consent: because marriage demanded fidelity, consent had to be 
the result of “the utmost freedom of choice, and between persons of 
matured judgment and discretion.”98 An 1882 decision of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court stressed that marriage required of the husband “his 
allegiance and fidelity to his wife [and] an obligation of support . . . .”99 
The right to marital faithfulness, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court asserted, was a primary expectation of the parties. Speaking 
specifically of the wife, the Court held: “There is no more important 
right of the wife than that, which secures to her in the marriage relation 
 
 92. See Shattuck v. Hammond, 46 Vt. 466, 470 (1874). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Wood v. State of Georgia, 48 Ga. 192, 295 (1873) (Trippe, J., concurring). 
 95. Livingston v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 49 P. 836, 837 (Cal. 1897) (quoting 
California Civil Code sec. 155). 
 96. Miller v. Miller, 1 Ohio Dec. 264, 264 (Ct. Common Pleas, 1894). 
 97. Zerega v. Percival, 15 So. 476, 484 (La. 1894). 
 98. Shafher v. State of Ohio, 20 Ohio 1, 6 (1851). 
 99. Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 195, 216 (1882). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had said much the 
same: “A man owes to his wife affection, fidelity, and protection.” See Richards v. Richards, 1 Grant 389, 
392 (Pa. 1856). 
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the companionship of her husband and the protection of his home.”100 
The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that a father whose adultery 
led to the breakup of his marriage could not thereafter obtain legal 
custody of his child.101 “[T]he father should not be permitted, when his 
own violation of duty had produced a dissolution of the marriage tie, to 
deprive the mother of her child to which she was entitled by fidelity to 
the marriage vow.”102 
The Kansas Supreme Court stressed the relationship of marital 
fidelity to marital stability and the larger social goods thereby served: 
Every one is fully aware that the happiness of the domestic circle, the 
preservation of the concord and confidence that should exist between 
husband and wife, depends largely, if not absolutely, on the 
maintenance of mutual confidence of the parties in the chastity and 
fidelity of each other. . . . The moral progress of the race, the purity of 
society, depends absolutely on home influences and surroundings.103 
The Tennessee Supreme Court similarly spoke for the unconscious 
Augustinianism of the age when it wrote: 
The marriage contract is peculiar, and in many respects different from 
all others. It is for life, and the parties have no power, by mutual 
consent, to dissolve it. The moment it is solemnized, society, for the 
wisest reasons, is interested in the fidelity with which it shall be 
observed; and it cannot be annulled, without the consent of the 
tribunals of the country, specially clothed with such power.104 
D. Marital Permanence 
As the Tennessee Supreme Court intimated, the good of fidelity was 
closely connected with the idea of marital permanence. The American 
commentators and courts emphatically rejected the Augustinian ideal, 
crystallized and given juridic definition by the medieval canonists and 
theologians, that marriage was a sacrament—a sign and symbol of God’s 
enduring love. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court put it, “The absurdity 
of the dogma, that marriage is a sacrament, and dissoluble only by the 
 
 100. Magrath v. Magrath, 103 Mass. 570, 579 (1870). Magrath was concerned, strictly speaking, 
not with infidelity, but with spousal abandonment. 
 101. See Cocke v. Hannum, 39 Miss. 423 (1860). 
 102. Id. at 439. 
 103. Masterman v. Masterman, 51 P. 277, 280 (Kan. 1897). 
 104. Cameron v. Cameron, 42 Tenn. 375, 376-377 (1865). 
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head of the church, instead of a political status subject to the power of 
the state, is manifest.”105 
But while marriage was not sacramental, in any juridic sense, 
nineteenth-century legal authorities nevertheless emphasized the 
importance of marital permanence. Chancellor Kent, in the course of 
reviewing the experiences of the ancient world and of modern Europe, 
asserted: “[T]he stronger authority, and the better policy, are in favour of 
the stability of the marriage union.”106 The Roman practice of liberal 
divorce, Kent concluded, was “injurious and shameful.”107 The Roman 
“facility of separation tended to destroy all mutual confidence and to 
inflame every trifling dispute.”108 This divorce mentality prevailed “until 
it was finally subdued by the influence of Christianity.”109 
Kent favored the restrictive approach to divorce and was grateful that 
American states tended to share his reluctance. In several states, Kent 
observed, “no divorce is granted, but by a special act of the legislature, 
according to the English practice.”110 Kent especially singled out the 
state of South Carolina. At the time of his writing, Kent agreeably noted 
regarding South Carolina, “there is no instance . . . since the revolution, 
of a divorce of any kind, either by the sentence of a court of justice, or by 
act of the legislature.”111 On the other hand, there were also states and 
territories that conferred jurisdiction over divorce to the courts, but even 
in these instances the grounds of absolute divorce, with right of 
remarriage, were generally limited to adultery.112 And where one 
attempted to marry while bound to another he or she broke the law: 
“No person can marry while the former husband or wife is living. 
Such second marriage is, by the common law, absolutely null and void, 
 
 105. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847); accord, Town of Londonderry v. Town of Chester, 2 N.H. 
268, 278 (1820) (“It is one of the corruptions of popery, that marriage itself is a ‘sacrament”). The 
Alabama Supreme Court, on the other hand, declared: 
Marriage is a divine institution, and, although in some respects it may partake of the 
nature and character of ordinary contracts, it has, with few exceptions, always considered 
as standing upon higher and holier grounds than any secular contracts. By a large portion 
of the Christian world it is believed, and held, to be a sacrament, and is reverenced and 
treated as such. Our Blessed Savior says, “a man shall leave his father and mother and 
cleave to his wife, and the twain shall be one flesh.” 
Campbell’s Adm’r and Heirs v. Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57, 67 (1869). 
 It is, of course, the abandonment of this sense of transcendent importance to the marital relationship that 
is at the heart of the modern crisis. 
 106. Kent, supra note 74, at 101. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 102. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 104. On the English practice, see Grey’s discussion, supra note 64. 
 111. Kent, supra note 74, at 104. 
 112. Id. at 104-105. 
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and it is probably an indictable offence in most, if not all of the states in 
the union.”113 
Writing near the close of the nineteenth century, Joel Bishop was 
more explicit in his reasons why parties to a marriage should be denied 
the freedom to dissolve their unions. Marriage, Bishop argued, served the 
greatest social goods: “Marriage, being the source of population, of 
education, of domestic felicity, – being the all in all without which the 
State could not exist, – it is the very highest public interest. Prima facie, 
therefore, each particular marriage is beneficial to the public; each 
divorce, prejudicial.”114 
Bishop continued by connecting these great public goods to the 
religious foundations of society and to its deepest ideals: 
Evils numberless, extending to the demoralization of society itself, 
would follow the abandonment of marriage as a permanent status, and 
permitting it to be the subject of experimental and temporary 
arrangements and fleeting partnerships. Wisely, therefore, the law holds 
it to be a union for life. It is so also in reason, in the common 
sentiments of mankind, and in the teachings of religion. No married 
partner should desert the other, commit adultery, beat or otherwise 
abuse the other, or forbear to do all that is possible for the sustenance 
and happiness of the other and of the entire family. Figuratively 
speaking, the two should walk hand in hand up the steeps of life and 
down its declivities and green slopes, then lay themselves together for 
the final sleep at the foot of the hill. Consequently there should be no 
divorces, no divorce courts, no books on the law of divorce. In Utopia, 
it will be so; it ought to be so in our own country.”115 
“But,” Bishop went on, it is not always possible that married partners 
remain together all their days.116 He expressed concern that a too 
dogmatic and religious approach to divorce, forbidding divorce of every 
type in the name of the marital ideal, would end badly.117 He rejected 
explicitly the Catholic position that marriage was “indissoluble, or only 
to be dissolved by the Pope.”118 Bishop argued, in contrast, that the state 
should be empowered to grant decrees of divorce with the right of 
remarriage where one of the parties failed to perform the essential 
obligations of the marital contract.119 But even where divorce with the 
 
 113. Id. at 79. 
 114. BISHOP, supra note 87, at 16. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 17. 
 118. Id. at 18. 
 119. Id. at 19. Bishop wrote:  
Matrimony is a natural right, to be forfeited, only by some wrongful act. Therefore the 
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right of remarriage was granted, Bishop concluded, it should not be 
exercised to the detriment of society. “These principles should not be 
carried to the extent of impairing the stability of the marriage relation.”120 
As support for this proposition, Bishop quoted Chancellor Kent.121 
Nineteenth-century case law endorsed these views. The Kentucky 
Supreme Court declared in 1841: 
Marriage, being more fundamental and important than any of the social 
relations, is controlled, as to its obligations, by a peculiar policy 
deemed essential to the permanent welfare of the whole social 
community. Being a contract for life, indissoluble by the consent of the 
parties merely, it should not be dissolved by the sovereign will for any 
other causes than such as are subversive of its essential ends or 
inconsistent with the general welfare. And it is certainly important to 
the general stability and harmony of that relation, that the parties 
should know, that, having taken each other with all their infirmities, 
and vowed reciprocal fidelity and forbearance for life, it is their 
interest, as well as their duty, to ‘bear and forbear’ as far as the 
resources of love, philosophy, and religion can enable them.”122 
Twenty-one years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
wrote: “The law, in the exercise of a wise and sound policy, seeks to 
render the contract of marriage, when once executed, as far as possible 
indissoluble. The great object of marriage in a civilized and Christian 
community is to secure the existence and permanence of the family 
relation, and to insure the legitimacy of offspring.”123 The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court echoed these remarks in 1881,124 as did the New York 
Superior Court in 1895.125 
In a bigamy prosecution in 1899, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled 
against the defendant’s attempt to assert his good faith as a defense: 
“Public policy forbids that the permanence of the marriage relation 
should depend on anything so precarious and elusive as the mental state 
of one of the parties.”126 The Supreme Court of Louisiana wrote in 1900: 
 
government should permit every suitable person to be the husband and wife of another, 
who will substantially perform the duties of the marital relation; and when it is in good 
faith entered into, and one of the parties without the other’s fault, so far fails in those 
duties as practically to frustrate its ends, the government should provide some means 
whereby, the failure being established and shown to be permanent, the innocent party 
may be freed from the mere legal bond of what has in fact ceased to be marriage. 
Id. 
 120. Id. at 20. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Logan v. Logan, 41 Ky. 142, 146 (1841). 
 123. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605, 607 (1862). 
 124. See Varney v. Varney, 8 N.W. 739, 741 (Wis. 1881). 
 125. See Fisk v. Fisk, 34 N.Y.S. 33, 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1895). 
 126. Reynolds v. State, 78 N.W. 483, 484 (Neb. 1899). 
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“Legislation looks to the permanence of marriage. It is to the best interest 
of society that it should be made permanent as far as possible.” 
In a debate that calls to mind, to a reader familiar with the medieval 
sources, old arguments over whether non-Christians might truly marry,127 
nineteenth-century courts debated whether the Native American peoples 
possessed valid marriage. This debate turned in substantial degree on the 
perceived permanence or impermanence of Indian marriage. In Roche v. 
Washington, the Indiana Supreme Court confronted the question whether 
marriage among the Miami tribe was valid where, the court stated, 
custom and practice allowed couples to separate “by consent.”128 
The Court felt compelled to consult the “jus gentium” – the “law of 
peoples” – to determine the meaning of marriage: 
What, then, constitutes the thing called a marriage? What is it in the eye 
of the jus gentium? It is the union of one man and one woman, “so long 
as they both shall live,” to the exclusion of all others, by an obligation 
which, during that time, the parties can not, of their own volition and 
act, dissolve, but which can be dissolved only by the authority of the 
State. Nothing short of this is a marriage.129 
Other courts were more willing to extend legal recognition to the 
matrimonial relations of Native American peoples. Thus, the ante-bellum 
Alabama Supreme Court upheld Choctaw marriage where the tribe was 
“governed by their own chiefs and laws,”130 while the Tennessee 
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to the Cherokee 
nation.131 These two decisions, relying on positivist, not natural-law 
analysis, premised their holdings on the law-making authority vested in 
tribal government. A quarter-century later, however, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court reached a different conclusion with respect to the 
Cherokee people: because “the tribe had professed Christianity [before 
the marriage in question],” and because “most of the marriages had been 
solemnized by a Justice of the Peace,” permanence was to be imputed as 
an element of Cherokee marriage.132 
Harsh in their application of “white man’s law” to Native peoples, 
echoing, all unconsciously, the commentaries of various twelfth- and 
thirteenth-century writers on the marital rights of unbelievers, these 
 
 127. Hugh of St. Victor, a prominent twelfth-century writer on marriage, proposed that non-
Christians as well as Christians might truly marry provided they take one another for purposes of 
procreation, keep faith with one another, love each other as companions, and provide for their mutual 
needs. See Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis Fidei Christianae, 176 PATROLOGIA LATINA 505. 
 128. See Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53, 55 (1862). 
 129. Id. at 57. 
 130. Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 51 (1845). 
 131. See Morgan v. M’Ghee, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 13 (1844). 
 132. State v. Ta-Cha-Na-Tah, 64 N.C. 614, 616 (1870). 
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decisions nevertheless serve as evidence of the commitment of American 
courts to permanence as an essential element of marriage. To be sure, 
some courts were more reluctant than others in endorsing a strict notion 
of marital permanence,133 but ideas of no-fault or free divorce were very 
far from the nineteenth-century judicial mind. Permanence, like 
procreation, like fidelity, was to be ranked among the essential elements 
of matrimonial union. 
The nineteenth-century lawyers and judges did not cite St. 
Augustine. They did not borrow directly from his treatise on the goods of 
marriage. Rather, it is clear, they operated within a mental universe 
defined by the parameters first laid down by St. Augustine and 
elaborated upon and systematized by generations of medieval and early 
modern ecclesiastical lawyers. Compelled by the absence of specialized 
ecclesiastical tribunals to entrust marriage to the protection of the state, 
these writers nevertheless saw marriage as something that was not 
merely state-created. Its essential elements – procreation, fidelity, and 
permanence – were part of a natural ordering of society. Too great 
departure from these norms, it was believed, could lead to calamitous 
social consequences. 
IV. THE AUGUSTINIAN GOODS OF MARRIAGE AND THE SAME-SEX 
DECISIONS 
In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Baker v. Nelson, 
confronted the issue of same-sex marriage. Two “[p]etitioners, Richard 
John Baker and James Michael McConnell, both adult male persons, 
made application” for a marriage license from the duly constituted 
authorities and were denied “on the sole ground that petitioners were of 
the same sex.”134 The petitioners sought to have the licensing statute 
declared unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection and due 
process clauses.135 
The Court answered by looking to the Augustinian goods of 
marriage – specifically, the good of procreation, as recognized by the 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court: 
The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely 
involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as 
 
 133. See Bauman v. Bauman, 18 Ark. 320 (1857), which notes that the distinction between divorce 
a mensa et thoro and divorce a vinculo had largely lost significance in Arkansas, and which recommends 
that the right of remarriage be freely granted to innocent parties “in cases of adultery, malicious desertion, 
long absence, or capital enmities . . . .” Id. at 325 (quoting a report of ecclesiastics made at the time of 
King Edward VI of England). 
 134. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
 135. Id., at 186. 
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old as the book of Genesis. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L. Ed. 1655, 1660 (1942), 
which invalidated Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act on 
equal protection grounds, stated in part: “Marriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” This 
historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded than the asserted 
contemporary concept of marriage and social interests for which 
petitioners contend.136 
 Three years later, in 1974, the Washington Court of Appeals 
confronted the issue of same-sex marriage and responded, as had Baker 
v. Nelson, with an invocation of the good of procreation: 
In the instant case, it is apparent that the state’s refusal to grant a 
license allowing the appellants to marry one another is not based upon 
appellants’ status as males, but rather it is based upon the state’s 
recognition that our society as a whole views marriage as the 
appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of 
children. This is true even though married couples are not required to 
become parents and even though some couples are incapable of 
becoming parents and even though not all couples who produce 
children are married. These, however, are exceptional situations. The 
fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution 
primarily because of societal values associated with the propagation of 
the human race.137 
 But as we know, at the same time Baker v. Nelson and Singer v. 
Hara were decided the relationship of marriage to the traditional goods 
ascribed to it by St. Augustine, by the medieval Catholic and the early 
modern Anglican canon lawyers and by the American common lawyers 
of the nineteenth century was under serious assault. Procreation was in 
the process of being disconnected from marriage; laws against adultery 
were only rarely and haphazardly enforced;138 divorce came to be much 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 138. In 1983, the Massachusetts adultery statute was found to be constitutional even though it was 
concededly only rarely enforced. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, , 449 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1983). The 
Court acknowledged that “the crime of adultery is rarely made the subject of criminal prosecution.” Id. at 
360. Even so, the Court declared: “The statute remains as a permissible expression of public policy.” Id. 
at 361. What that policy was remained unarticulated by the Court. Rather, the Court suggested that it 
belonged to the legislature to change the policy, not the judiciary. 
 A similar constitutional challenge to the Utah adultery statute on privacy grounds was rejected by federal 
district court. See Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465 (D.Utah 1995). The Court 
admonished that privacy was a doctrine that required the imposition of carefully-drawn limitations: “To 
some extent balancing is essential. Modern life is urbanized and communal and requires restriction of 
some individual interests in order for all citizens to be able to enjoy a reasonable life. Harmony dictates 
some limitation on individual interests. An absolute right of privacy would be a form of anarchy.” Id. at 
1478. The Court concluded that rights of intimate association were not without limits. It looked to the 
language of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) for guidance on the proper boundaries of 
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more freely granted, especially on no-fault grounds. Marriage, it was 
observed, had gone from being the highest sort of contract, one in which 
the whole of society had an interest in maintaining, to being of lesser 
status than any other contract, since it was terminable at the will of either 
party.139 Today, of course, who could even contemplate a return to 
prosecution for adultery, or to the restrictive divorce laws that prevailed 
at the time of Kent or Bishop? Indeed, a persuasive argument can be 
made that the relaxation of the laws, especially those concerning divorce, 
has had some beneficient social consequences, allowing parties to depart 
from abusive relationships that were destructive to the parties but that did 
not fit the standard grounds of divorce. 
 But our concern today is not with tracing these developments, 
which would be a long and arduous undertaking. It would also ultimately 
be a distraction from our central thesis. Rather, we are concerned with 
identifying the alternative marital theory proposed by the Hawaii and 
Vermont Supreme Courts. 
 A nineteenth-century writer like Chancellor Kent commenced his 
analysis of marriage with the structure and demands of the natural law 
firmly in mind. Neither legislators nor courts had the right or power to 
“make” the law of marriage. Rather, it was their solemn duty to 
recognize and give legal force to a pattern already laid down in the 
natural order.140 This pattern, as outlined above, embraced the 
Augustinian goods of procreation, fidelity, and unity. 
 When one turns to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr 
v. Lewin, on the other hand, one finds a court that has arrogated to the 
state the full authority over determining what constitutes a marriage.141 
“The power to regulate marriage is a sovereign function reserved 
exclusively to the respective states,” the Baehr Court declared.142 
By its very nature, the power to regulate the marriage relation includes 
the power to determine the requisites of a valid marriage contract and 
to control the qualifications of the contracting parties, the forms and 
procedures necessary to solemnize the marriage, the duties and 
 
privacy interests. “Nothing suggests the privacy interest recognized in Griswold could encompass a right 
to a sexual relationship outside of marriage or one contrary to marital integrity. No right to perform an act 
of marital infidelity was even alluded to in the majority opinion.” Oliverson, 875 F. Supp. at 1480. 
 The reluctance of the Massachusetts Court and the labors of the Utah Court, demonstrate that even 
though adultery statutes might survive constitutional scrutiny, their continued vitality remain subject to 
legal challenge. 
 139. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 255, 265, 
273-274 (1973). 
 140. See supra notes 73-85, and accompanying text. 
 141. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 142. Id. at 58. 
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obligations it creates, its effect upon property and other rights, and the 
grounds for marital dissolution.143 
 The Baehr Court acknowledged contrary authority to its totalistic 
claims on behalf of the state’s control of the marital relationship. It 
quoted Jones v. Hallahan’s pronouncement that “Marriage was a custom 
long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose. . . . 
[M]arriage has always been considered as a union of a man and a 
woman. . . .”144 Baehr, however, never addressed the implications of this 
insight, preferring rather to see in the Jones case a failure to address the 
equal protection issue supposedly inherent in this understanding of 
marriage.145 It noted also the Washington Court of Appeals’ denial of a 
marriage license to a same-sex couple in Singer v. Hara.146 The Singer 
Court had written regarding the same-sex appellants that they “were not 
denied a marriage license because of their sex; rather, they were denied a 
marriage license because of the nature of marriage itself.”147 
 The Baehr Court’s response to these invocations of a natural order 
to the marital relationship was to exalt the power of the state: “marriage 
is a state-conferred legal status, the existence of which gives rise to rights 
and benefits reserved exclusively to that relationship.”148 The Court left 
no room for Chancellor Kent or Joel Bishop in the face of this 
declaration of state power. The Singer Court’s reasoning was specifically 
denounced as “tortured and conclusory sophistry.”149 
 Gone from this understanding of marriage is any notion of 
teleology. There is no sense that marriage exists to serve particular 
purposes or that it is intended to fulfill certain goods. This failure to 
appreciate that marriage might serve some positive social good emerges 
full-blown in the court’s definition of marriage. The Baehr Court wrote: 
“This court construes marriage as ‘a partnership to which both parties 
bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and 
efforts.’”150 
 Absent from this definition is any notion of procreation, or the 
fidelity or loyalty owed by one partner to the other, or the partnership for 
life that the parties are expected to share. The definition the court 
proposes is virtually indistinguishable from the definition one might 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 61 (quoting Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 63 (citing Singer v. Hara, 522 P. 2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied 84 Wash. 
2d 1008 (1974)). 
 147. Id. at 63 (quoting Singer, 522 P. 2d at 1196). 
 148. Id. at 58. 
 149. Id. at 63. 
 150. Id. at 58 (quoting Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 483, 836 P.2d 484, 491 (1992)). 
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accord a business partnership between two persons. Eliminate the word 
“both” and it might include a committee charged with planning a Fourth 
of July celebration, or a school board setting its budget. Indeed, it could 
embrace nearly all forms of collaborative enterprise. 
 But this “state-conferred status,” this “partnership to which both 
parties bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies 
and efforts,” nevertheless was the vehicle through which the state 
conferred certain benefits. By privileging, as it were, heterosexual 
poolings of financial resources and individual energy, other forms of 
partnership were denied access to benefits. These include tax benefits, 
access to the courts for spousal support, or child custody, and rights to 
property division, among other benefits.151 If marriage has any purpose, 
on this analysis, it is to facilitate the distribution of state-controlled 
benefits. It has become, according to the Hawaii Supreme Court, one 
more social-welfare program. 
 Baker v. State, the Vermont decision of 1999, takes a much more 
sophisticated approach to the meaning of marriage.152 The litigants in 
Baker, same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses, conceded that 
marriage in Vermont traditionally encompassed heterosexual unions and 
served the purposes of procreation and child-rearing.153 The plaintiffs, 
however, wished to shift the premises. Regarding procreation, plaintiffs 
contended that a prohibition on same-sex unions failed to serve the 
state’s interest, given “the large number of married couples without 
children, and the increasing incidence of same-sex couples with 
children . . . .”154 Plaintiffs proposed an alternative understanding of the 
nature of the marital relationship: “They argue[d] . . . that the underlying 
purpose of marriage is to protect and encourage the union of committed 
couples and that, absent an explicit legislative prohibition, the statutes 
should be interpreted broadly to include committed same-sex couples.”155 
 The Court, however, elected to ground its decision not on the 
statutory scheme authorizing and supporting the marital relationship, but 
on the Vermont Constitution’s “Common Benefits Clause.”156 Like the 
Hawaii Court before it, the Vermont Supreme Court viewed marriage in 
terms of the benefits it conferred. And the Vermont Constitution 
prohibited discrimination in the conferral of benefits: 
 
 151. Id. at 59. 
 152. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 153. Id. at 869-70. 
 154. Id. at 870. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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The concept of equality at the core of the Common Benefits Clause was 
not the eradication of racial or class distinctions, but rather the 
elimination of artificial governmental preferments and advantages. The 
Vermont Constitution would ensure that the law uniformly afforded 
every Vermonter its benefit, protection, and security, so that social and 
political preeminence would reflect differences of capacity, disposition, 
and virtue, rather than governmental favor and privilege.157 
 If an equal distribution of benefits is the norm, the Court 
reasoned, and the status of marriage offered substantial benefits,158 then 
“any statutory exclusion [of a group of persons] must necessarily be 
grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority 
that the justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned.”159 
 The state of Vermont countered by asserting its interest in 
providing for the raising of the next generation: 
The State has a strong interest, it argues, in promoting a permanent 
commitment between couples who have children to ensure that their 
offspring are considered legitimate and receive ongoing parental 
support. The State contends, further, that the Legislature could 
reasonably believe that sanctioning same-sex unions “would diminish 
society’s perception of the link between procreation and child 
rearing . . . [and] advance the notion that fathers or mothers . . . are 
mere surplusage to the functions of procreation and child rearing.”160 
 The Court responded by asserting, in effect, that the State’s 
purported justification was both under and over inclusive. On the one 
hand, the Court noted, there are “many opposite-sex couples [who] marry 
for reasons unrelated to procreation, [and] some of these couples never 
intend to have children, and . . . others are incapable of having 
children.”161 On the other hand, “there is no dispute that a significant 
number of children are actually being raised by same-sex parents, and 
that increasing numbers of children are being conceived by such parents 
through a variety of techniques.”162 In a sense, the Court asserted, the 
state’s interest in procreation might even be served by permitting same-
sex marriage.163 
 
 157. Id. at 876-77. 
 158. Id. at 883-84. The Court provides a comprehensive list of marital benefits, including the 
spousal share of the estate, intestate provisions, the right to sue for wrongful death or loss of consortium, 
joint ownership of property, and a host of other benefits. 
 159. Id. at 884. 
 160. Id. at 881. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 882 
Therefore, to the extent that the state’s purpose in licensing civil marriage was, and is, to 
legitimize children and provide for their security, the statutes plainly exclude many same-
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 Ultimately, however, the Vermont Court, like the Hawaii Court, 
did not define marriage as serving a procreative end.  This was one of a 
number of possible purposes for marriage, and one that the parties 
themselves might freely accept or renounce. After all, the Court 
observed, there are are many who marry who never intend to have 
children.164 Although taking greater cognizance than Baehr of the state’s 
interest in procreation, the Vermont Court, in the final analysis, viewed 
marriage as a kind of co-mingling of state-conferred benefits on the one 
hand and mutual affection between the parties, on the other: 
While many have noted the symbolic or spiritual significance of the 
marital relation, it is plaintiffs’ claim to the secular benefits and 
protections of a singularly human relationship that, in our view, 
characterizes this case. The State’s interest in extending official 
recognition and legal protection to the professed commitment of two 
individuals to a lasting relationship of mutual affection is predicated on 
the belief that legal support of a couple’s commitment provides 
 
sex couples who are no different from opposite-sex couples with respect to these 
objectives. If anything, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the legal protections 
incident to marriage exposes their children to the precise risks that the State argues the 
marriage laws are designed to secure against. 
Id. 
The Catholic Church’s teaching on artificial means of reproduction is to see it as morally unacceptable for 
several reasons, chief among them the severance of the procreative act from the natural sexual union of 
the parties to a marriage. According to the Catholic Catechism: 
Techniques that entail the dissociation of husband and wife, by the intrusion of a person 
other than the couple (donation of sperm, or ovum, surrogate uterus) are gravely immoral. 
These techniques (heterologous artificial insemination and fertilization) infringe the 
child’s right to be born of a father and mother known to him and bound to each other by a 
marriage. They betray the spouse’s “right to become a father and a mother only through 
each other.” (Quoting DONUM VITAE, intro., 2). 
Techniques involving only the married couple (homologous artificial insemination and 
fertilization) are perhaps less reprehensible, yet remain morally unacceptable. They 
dissociate the sexual act from the procreative act. The act which brings the child into 
existence is no longer an act by which two persons give themselves to one another, but 
one that “entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and 
biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin and destiny of the 
human person. Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity and 
equality that must be common to parents and children.” (Quoting DONUM VITAE, II.5). 
See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, paras. 2376-2377, p. 571 (2d ed., 1997). 
 164. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. St. Augustine, for his part, found it impossible to 
characterize as marriage a relationship between those who have affirmatively taken steps to frustrate 
permanently the conception or birth of children. See DE BONO CONIUGALI, sec. 5.5, p. 1011 (Walsh 
edition). This teaching remains a foundation of the Catholic canon law of marriage. Canon 1055, sec. 1 of 
the Latin-rite Code of Canon Law (1983) provides that marriage serves the good of the spouses and the 
procreation and offspring of children. Exclusion of the good of children, or the goods of fidelity or 
indissolubility, will result in an invalid marriage. See C. 1101 (1983 Code of Canon Law). See also THE 
CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY (James Coriden, et al., eds., 1985), at 784-787. 
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stability for the individuals, their family, and the broader 
community.165 
V. THE AUGUSTINIAN GOODS: DO THEY RETAIN VITALITY? 
 In Standhardt v. Superior Court, an action brought by two males 
seeking a marriage license so as to marry one another, a division of the 
Arizona Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas required recognition of 
homosexual marriage.166 The Court first determined that Lawrence did 
not mandate that homosexual unions must be accorded the status of 
marriage.167 Indeed, the Standhardt Court observed that Lawrence had 
explicitly declared that “the case before it ‘[did] not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.’”168 
 The Court then considered the legal contours of the marital 
relationship. The Court looked to Maynard v. Hill for guidance on the 
societal value marriage retained. Marriage, the Standhardt Court quoted, 
“‘creat[ed] the most important relation in life . . . having more to do with 
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution.’”169 
 The Court then rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to connect their claim 
with the fundamental-rights analysis of Loving v. Virginia.170 “Implicit in 
Loving and predecessor opinions is the notion that marriage, often linked 
to procreation, is a union forged between one man and one woman.”171 
The Standhardt Court continued: 
Thus, while Loving expanded the traditional scope of the fundamental 
right to marry by granting interracial couples unrestricted access to the 
state-sanctioned marriage institution, that decision was anchored to the 
concept of marriage as a union involving persons of the opposite sex. In 
contrast, recognizing a right to marry someone of the same sex would 
not expand the established right to marry, but would redefine the legal 
meaning of “marriage.”172 
 The Standhardt Court did not explicitly endorse the procreative 
purposes of marriage. It did acknowledge that legislative protection of 
 
 165. Baker, 744 A.2d at 888-89. 
 166. See Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 167. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458. 
 168. Id. at 456 (quoting Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484). 
 169. Id. at 458 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205). 
 170. Id.; cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 171. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458. 
 172. Id. at 458. 
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this policy was not outside the boundary of judicial protection. The Court 
stressed the importance of history to its analysis: “The history of the 
law’s treatment of marriage as an institution involving one man and one 
woman, together with recent, explicit reaffirmations of that view, lead 
invariably to the conclusion that the right to enter a same-sex marriage is 
not a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process.”173 
 One is entitled to ask whether the Augustinian goods retain 
vitality. Standhardt suggests that they continue to exert some influence. 
But Standhardt, in the final analysis, does not mount a robust defense of 
the traditional marital goods. History, tradition, and judicial deference to 
legislative policy are the values that seem to dominate Standhardt’s 
analysis, not an express solicitude for the traditional goals of the marital 
relationship. One must ask the question, without here answering it, 
whether such values are sufficient judicial protection of the marital 
relationship. 
 
 
 173. Id. at 460. 
